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RESOLUTION 2122: THE "ABORTED" DEBATE
DEBDATTA DOBE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The core theme of this article is the recently adopted
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2122 on Women
and Peace and Security.' Resolution 2122 is the latest in the
United Nations' ("UN") series of thematic resolutions on
Women and Peace and Security. This resolution has garnered
great interest being the first of its kind where reproductive
justice and access to abortion has been impliedly built in and
unanimously adopted by member states. Within the United
States, women's human rights advocates have expressed hope
that Resolution 2122 will prompt modifications in the archaic
Helms' Amendment.
This article criticizes the above presumptions and
advances the argument that Resolution 2122, though
landmark, when viewed from the prism of prior United Nations
Security Council ("UNSC") resolutions, is more regressive than
many concurrently existing international instruments. Many of
these may be constructed to allow abortion in cases beyond
wartime rape, which is what Resolution 2122 currently allows.
This article contends that among pre-existing ambiguous law
and Resolution 2122, which makes a very restrictive case for
access to abortion, the former advances the position of women
more effectively. In identifying problems, this article does not
intend to make a case for a universal right of abortion on
demand; rather it advances the primacy of reproductive justice
as a holistic concept. It also argues that, at the very minimum,
international legal instruments should stop paying homage to
* I would like to acknowledge my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor,
Professor Jeannie Suk, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, for her
valuable insight and feedback on several versions of this article and for her
professional guidance in structuring, presentation and analysis of the concepts
embodied in this article.
1. S.C. Res. 2122, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2122 (Oct. 18, 2013).
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national legal restrictions. Instead, international frameworks
should start advocating a risk/need-based criteria for access to
abortion services in times of conflict, whether or not otherwise
mandated by the domestic laws of the states. It rejects the war-
rape or similar event based criteria for granting access to
abortion on the grounds that such criteria merely further
androcentric, paternalistic legal attitudes which perpetuate
victimization of women.2 In order to do so, the article borrows
heavily from feminist jurisprudence and approaches to
international law.
While a major part of this article centers on a critique of
Resolution 2122 itself, it is intended to serve a larger purpose.
Section II attempts to highlight the multifarious ways in which
women's reproductive rights and choices are compromised on
account of conflict. Women continue to suffer from reproductive
impairment in ways the law, thus far, has failed to take into
account, particularly when women take up the role of
combatants. This section will be followed by a brief overview of
existing human rights, humanitarian law, and international
criminal law regimes in Section III. In this section, this article
advances the argument that most legal instruments ignore
reproductive rights on account of the strictly paternalistic
nature of international law that relegates women's concerns to
a subsidiary position.3 The aim is to provide the reader an idea
of the existing protections in the field of reproductive justice as
well as highlight the gaps in law, pitfalls in enforcement, and
barriers to effective realization of rights. This helps in
contextualizing the provisions of Resolution 2122 better when
discussed subsequently in Section IV. That section begins with
an acknowledgement of the positive contributions of Resolution
2122-primarily the discontinuance of the subsidiary to
national law exception found in most instruments dealing with
reproductive rights.
After articulating the positive gains, the article proceeds in
Section V to highlight the many ways in which Resolution 2122
misses an opportunity to promote reproductive justice for
conflict stricken women. This section concludes with an
analysis of the language of Resolution 2122 with three broad
approaches advanced by feminist scholars to adjudge whether
Resolution 2122 sheds the patriarchal cloak and truly embraces
2. Cf. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 390-91 (1999).
3. Cf. id. at 389.
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reproductive justice in a holistic way.
In the last section, this article considers reformative
models proposed by feminist scholars that future UNSC
thematic resolutions on Women and Peace and Security might
consider adopting. It explores the (a) equality model, which
states that the way to redress harms to women, is to subject all
civilians to improved protection or to ensure better enforcement
of the already existing rules;4 and (b) the equal but different
model, which holds that new and special laws are required to
re-contextualize gender and bring a gendered interpretation in
international dialogues.5  Though Resolution 2122 leans
towards the latter at present, the ideal would be to effect a
compromise between the two schools in the future so as to
ensure not only that laws are re-contextualized and that what
is achieved is not merely formalistic, but instead, functional
equality. The article concludes with a recognition of the
contribution made by the UNSC in bringing about
transformative change in the lives of women. The article also
seeks to encourage women's human rights advocates to stake a
claim to a larger piece of the pie and not be satisfied by the
minor, though significant, allowances made by Resolution
2122.
II. HOW CONFLICT AFFECTS WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
Women's reproductive freedom is compromised in many
ways, depending on the capacities in which they experience
conflict, whether as civilians or combatants. For women in
combat roles, their treatment and status within the military
evidences an inferior position in society,6 and it comes as no
surprise therefore that their special needs, including ensuring
reproductive justice, are so often overlooked. The laws of armed
conflict have largely ignored the reproductive health needs of
4. See Fernando R. Teson, Feminism and International Law: A Reply, 33
VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 652-54 (1993).
5. See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Ms.
Radhika Coomaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance with Commission
Resolution 1997/44, 95, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (Jan. 26, 1998)
[hereinafter U.N. ESCOR].
6. See U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Dep't of Econ. & Soc.
Affairs, Gender-Based Persecution, Rep. of the Expert Grp. Meeting, 52, U.N.
Doc. EGM/GBP/1997/Report (Dec. 6, 1999).
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women combatants in captivity or otherwise. While women are
increasingly serving in combat roles, by and large, women's
experience of war continues to be understood as synonymous to
the experiences of the civilian populace.8 This is amply
demonstrated in many statements, including that of Patrick
Cammaert, former Deputy Force Commander of the UN
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who stated
that "it has probably become more dangerous to be a woman
than a soldier in an armed conflict." 9 This statement presumes
that the two roles are mutually exclusive and it is in the
civilian role that law protects women, albeit in a paternalistic
fashion. Be it civilian women or combatant, conflict affects
their reproductive capacities in several ways, often suffered in
the shadow of legal oversight, some of which are set out below.
A. VULNERABILITY
Vulnerability stemming from being a woman can cause
adverse consequences in conflict. ° While vulnerability itself is
a universal human phenomenon, it has a deeply gendered
association that equates it with "victimhood, deprivation,
dependency, and pathology."" " [W] omen's reproductive capacity
makes them particularly vulnerable to shortages in food,
medicine, reliable birth control and medical treatment."
2
Effects of prohibited weapons of mass destruction have been
known to cause pregnancy complications and sterility amongst
7. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art.14, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Third
Geneva Convention] (falling silent on the issue of reproductive health beyond
short-term treatment of women that are pregnant, have become pregnant, or
have children already).
8. See Nadine Puechguirbal, The Cost of Ignoring Gender in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Situations: A Feminist Perspective, AMSTERDAM L.F., Winter
2012, at 8.
9. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5916th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5916 (June
19, 2008) (explaining the long-term brutality that survivors experience).
10. See generally Judith Gardam & Michelle Jarvis, Women and Armed
Conflict: The International Response to the Beijing Platform for Action, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing the effects of armed conflict on
women).
11. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2008)
(discussing the public perception of vulnerability).
12. Judith Gardam, Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the
Silence?, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 61 (1997).
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women, 3 on account of their biologically vulnerable status. In
addition, war deepens already existing inequalities 14 and makes
survival of women and children particularly challenging in
situations of complex humanitarian emergency. 15 Solely by
virtue of being considered subordinate to men, with scant
regard for the value of their lives, women are at risk of being
overlooked and their reproductive rights and concerns
considered unimportant. 6 For example, in Somalia, when relief
agencies consulted heads of households, which are in most
cases are men, for prioritizing the distribution of aid,17 women's
access to such relief was automatically dependent on the
discretion of such male familial heads.8 Reproductive health
concerns are therefore unlikely in such situations to assume
high priority. 9
B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
Women in conflict and post conflict societies are faced with
a plethora of problems including deterioration in public health
infrastructure in their country, reduction of government
spending on health, and lack of access to medical services due
20to displacement or otherwise. On the economic front, women
13. See, e.g., Christine Gosden & Derek Gardener, ABC of Conflict and
Disaster: Weapons of Mass Destruction-Threats and Responses, BMJ, Aug.
2005, at 400 (explaining the long-term effects of weapons of mass destruction).
14. See, e.g., Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-
15, 1995, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 6, 26, 30, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20 (Sept. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Beijing Platform] (highlighting
inequality by emphasizing the great number of women living in poverty).
15. See generally Naeema Al Gasseer et al., Status of Women and Infants
in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN'S HEALTH,
Jul.-Aug. 2004, at 7.
16. See Charlesworth, supra note 2, at 385 (discussing needs specific to
women that go unnoticed).
17. Id.
18. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Women, Vulnerability, and Humanitarian
Emergencies, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10-11 (2011).
19. See THERESE MCGINN ET AL., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH FOR CONFLICT-
AFFECTED PEOPLE: POLICES, RESEARCH AND PROGRAMMES 10-12
(Humanitarian Practice Network, 2004) (illustrating how the lack of health
options available to women may lead to a higher death rate for maternal
causes in certain circumstances).
20. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on
Women and Peace and Security, 10, SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2013/525 (Sept. 4,
2013) [hereinafter Ban Ki-moon Report] ("[G]reater attention needs to be paid
to the full range of human rights violations experienced by women, including
the gender-specific impacts of forced displacement, family separation,
2015]
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constitute the great majority of the informal, unskilled, unpaid
domestic labor force in most countries, which explains why
women are more affected by the socio-economic dimensions of
conflict. 21 This 'extra-domestic' labor is unaccounted for and
unrecognized in most societies.22
Changes in social perception also affect reproductive
health of women and impair free choice. For instance, during
the Sri Lankan conflict a regression in the acceptable
marriageable age for women was observed, with familial
pressure on early marriages to ensure male protection to guard
female honor.23 This of course does not necessarily pre-empt the
occurrence of forced marriages ordered by armed groups or
marriages contracted to combat situations of poverty.24 The
shame or loss of honor of the woman or her husband linked to
sexual violence, rape and pregnancy arising thereof often deter
women from exercising their reproductive choices. 5 Emphasis
on honor holds by way of natural corollary an implication that
those surviving rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual mutilation
are rendered dishonorable.6 This leads women to keep silent
withholding of humanitarian assistance and loss of land, property and
livelihood.").
21. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN AND HEALTH: TODAY'S
EVIDENCE TOMORROW'S AGENDA 9-11 (2009) (explaining reasons for the
socioeconomic differences between men and women and the resulting impact
on overall health).
22. See, e.g., Margot Wilson-Moore, Women's Work in Homestead Gardens:
Substance, Patriarchy, and Status in Northwest Bangladesh, 18 URB.
ANTHROPOLOGY 281, 288-90, 293-94, (1989) (describing the invisibility of the
work women do, and both the direct and indirect contributions they make).
23. See Yasmin Tambiah, Sexuality and Women's Rights in Armed
Conflict in Sri Lanka, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, May 2004, at 78, 80.
24. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention,
Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, 62-65, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30
(Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Recommendation No. 30] (detailing effects on
marriage and family relations in conflict and post-conflict contexts).
25. See Ruth Rubio-Marin, Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual and
Reproductive Violence: A Decalogue, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 69, 75
(2012) ("Patriarchal societies generally attach a preeminent value to women's
chastity and reproductive capacity, seeing women's reproduction as a way of
guaranteeing the survival of both community and culture. A woman who is
sexually violated, impregnated by enemies, or kidnapped into sexual and
domestic enslavement is therefore often regarded as 'disgracing family honor,
being unclean or contaminated, [or] being a seductress.' . . . . The moral
condemnation is shifted from the perpetrator onto the victim. Alternatively,
the perception of victimization is displaced from the victim onto her partner or
wider community, whose honor is deemed spoiled.")
26. See Karima Bennoune, Do We Need New International Law to Protect
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and not seek accessible healthcare.
Another regrettable consequence of conflict is the impact
that changing social and legal structures, separation from
family, and power relationships has on adolescents and
children, making them extremely susceptible to sexual abuse
27and exploitation. Such susceptibility is acutely visible among
displaced female children, such as those in the conflicts of El
Salvador, Ethiopia and Uganda, one-third of all child soldiers
were female.28 Not surprisingly therefore, in all these conflicts
there were reports of rape and unsafe abortions.29 Additionally,
deliberate and widespread use of rape as a weapon of warfare
to force the targeted community into submission, such as was
employed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur and
Rwanda has been well documented to cause long-term trauma
and physical injuries amongst victims." This, coupled with the
stress of living in desperate conditions, causes long-term
impairment of reproductive capacities. 31 Clearly, survival under
such circumstances is not conducive to exercise of any form of
reproductive autonomy.
C. ACCESSIBILITY
Amidst all the limitations on exercising their reproductive
choices, the one that is arguably of greatest consequence to
women caught in conflict, post conflict society rebuilding, or in
a state of displacement, is the lack of access to contraception
Women in Armed Conflict?, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 363, 384 (2006-07)
("The emphasis on honor is especially offensive since it may imply that a
woman survivor of wartime rape or other sexual violence is dishonored, a
powerful notion fraught with terrible real world consequences for the woman
and her family.")
27. See Julia Matthews & Sheri Ritsema, Addressing the Reproductive
Health Needs of Conflict-Affected Young People, 19 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 6,
6 (2004) ("Refugee adolescents face additional difficulties that put their
reproductive health (RH) at risk.").
28. See, e.g., id. at 6-8 (analyzing the challenges facing refuge
adolescents).
29. See, e.g., Maxwell's Story: How a Former Child Soldier Became a
Reproductive Health Advocate, IPAS (Apr. 8, 2010),
http://www.ipas.org/en/News/2010/April/Maxwells-story--How-a-former-child-
soldier-became-a-reproductive-health-advocate.aspx.
30. See, e.g., Sally Hargreaves, Rape as a War Crime: Putting Policy into
Practice, 357 THE LANCET 737, 737 (2001) (discussing rape in the context of
war).
31. See id.
2015]
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and safe abortion.32  Displaced women find themselves
vulnerable to rape, unwanted pregnancy, unsafe deliveries and
sexually transmitted diseases. 33 It is a harsh reality that
women embroiled in conflict face a higher risk of maternal
mortality than women in stable societies. 4 The average
maternal mortality rate in Afghanistan after two decades of
conflict is estimated to be between 1,600 and 2,200 deaths per
100,000 live births, ranging from around 418 deaths in Kabul
to around 6,507 in Badakshan.5
Empirical research indicates that displaced
persons/refugees and women otherwise involved in conflict are
not always willing or able to undertake the responsibilities of
parenthood under the extreme adverse situation they find
themselves in following strife.6 Alternatively, some others go
through pregnancy with the desire to replace the children they
lost in conflict.3 7 For those desiring to opt out of the
childbearing process, options are limited. In internally
displaced persons ("IDP") camps in Northern Uganda women
using some form of contraception legally permitted by the
government prior to conflict found themselves unable to access
it during their camp stay.38 This left the women with no
alternatives besides abstinence or unsafe abortions. 39 Displaced
women also risk finding themselves in countries where
abortion remains illegal. 40 Humanitarian assistance and aid is
32. See, e.g., Ban Ki-moon Report, supra note 20, 11 (advocating access
to emergency contraception and safe abortion).
33. See, e.g., Tambiah, supra note 23, at 83.
34. See Ban Ki-moon Report, supra note 20, at 22 box 19 ("In conflict and
post-conflict settings, the rate of maternal mortality tends to be approximately
50 per cent higher than the global average.").
35. See Linda A. Bartlett et al., Where Giving Birth Is a Forecast of Death:
Maternal Mortality in Four Districts of Afghanistan, 1999-2002, 365 LANCET
864, 867, 868 tbl.3 (2005).
36. See, e.g., Therese McGinn, Reproductive Health of War-Affected
Populations: What Do We Know?, 26 INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 174, 174 (2000)
(highlighting the different approaches to fertility in different cultures and
socioeconomic circumstances).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Judy Austin et al., Reproductive Health: A Right for Refugees
and Internally Displaced Persons, 16 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 10, 14 (2008).
39. Id.
40. See generally Press Release, Third Comm., Several Aspects of Sexual,
Reproductive Health - Providing Information, Using Contraception, Abortion
- Should be 'Decriminalized', Third Comm. Told, U.N. Press Release
GA/SHC/4018 (Oct. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/gashc4018.doc.htm.
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not available for abortion care, even if the pregnancy is a result
of rape and humanitarian agencies are often precluded from
extending aid for the purposes of abortion.41 Despite these
manifold consequences, the existing legal regime ranging from
persuasive 'soft laws' to binding treaty provisions, fall short of
implementing the aspirational aims they encompass.
III. THE MASCULINE WORLD WOMEN INHABIT:
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS UNDER EXTANT
LAWS
International law by its very nature and structure is
paternalistic, concerned with maintaining the status quo of
male dominance.4 2 Reproductive rights are not of concern to
men, resulting in them being allocated to a sphere of
unimportance and neglect for decades. 43 Explanations of the
assignment of values to reproductive rights can be found in the
discourse of the public-private dichotomy as well as the
nature/culture divide, with women being identified as the
former and men as the latter.44 This section sets out the
provisions enumerated under certain human rights,
humanitarian law and international criminal law instruments.
Its aim is to provide a summary of the already existing
protections in the field of reproductive justice as well as
highlight the gaps in law, pitfalls in enforcement and barriers
to effective realization of the rights. This will help in
contextualizing the provisions of Resolution 2122 better when
discussed in subsequent sections.45
A. THE HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
While some war-time events are common to both women
and men, though their experiences of such events are not
similarly shared, scholars and human rights advocates have
gradually come to recognize the other distinct experiences of
women caught up in armed conflict which inevitably challenge
the pre-established roles of the female in the domestic sphere
41. See generally id.
42. Charlesworth et al., supra note 2, at 1-2.
43. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence: An
Agenda for Research, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 521 (1987-88).
44. See generally Bartlett et al., supra note 35.
45. S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1.
2015]
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and particularly affect their right to sexual and reproductive
choices.46  However, human rights discourse has found it
particularly hard to grapple with and respond to the
controversial subject of reproductive freedom, bodily integrity
and sexual autonomy, specifically the control of sexual and
reproductive behavior and its link to gender constructs.47
Additionally most human rights monitoring bodies established
with the intent of protecting and realizing women's human
rights suffer from institutional and geographical separation
from the mainstream, making their recommendations empty
rhetoric only.48
1. Policy centric instruments
Despite this lack of gender specific perspectives, it is
pertinent nevertheless to examine whether the current laws
provide a degree of protection to women whose reproductive
functions are being compromised on account of conflict. At the
1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action ("Vienna
Declaration"), adopted by the UN World Conference on Human
Rights, it was agreed that violation of the human rights of
women constitute fundamental infractions to the core human
rights and humanitarian law principles and that they require a
"particularly effective response. "49
The first attempt at developing this response was in 1994,
at the International Conference on Population and
Development ("ICPD") where a full and detailed outline of
reproductive freedom for all persons (including refugees and
IDPs) was adopted.5 0 The consensus document in fact called for
universal access to reproductive health services including
family planning and sexual health.5' Further, the 1995 Fourth
46. Ban Ki-moon Report, supra note 20, 11.
47. Id.
48. See Laura Reanda, Human Rights and Women's Rights: The United
Nations Approach, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 11 (1981) (discussing the use of
recommendations).
49. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, art. 38, UN Doc.
A/CONF.157/24 (Part 1) (Oct. 13, 1993).
50. See International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo,
Egypt, Sep. 5-13, 1993, Programme of Action of the International Conference
on Population and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF .171/13/Rev.1 (1993). The
components of reproductive rights were set out in the JCPD Program of Action
7.2 & 7.3.
51. Adrienne Germain & Rachel Kyte, The Cairo Consensus: The Right
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World Conference for Women ("Beijing Platform") recognizes
women's human right to "have control over and decide freely
and responsibly on matters relating to their sexuality,
including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion,
discrimination and violence." 2 While this appears to tilt the
balance in favor of liberality, the conference documents tread
carefully around the issue of abortion. Rather than calling upon
governments to legalize abortions in certain restricted
circumstances, such as breakdown of public health
infrastructure post-conflict, the conference documents draw the
line at advocating for abortion when legal under domestic laws.
The Beijing Platform has also been criticized for endorsing the
'circumscribed idea of womanhood' as synonymous to
motherhood. However, it must be said that they view unsafe
abortions as a public health concern and call for post abortion
care for women.5 3 The greatest service of the conference
documents is delineating human rights from religious beliefs
and highlighting the absolute enforceability of the former while
simultaneously rejecting conscientious objection. 4
Despite this indication of growing international consensus
favoring reproductive autonomy, many refugees, IDPs and
women caught in conflict continue to exist without reaping the
benefits of such legal protection, which results primarily
because the simplest reproductive health interventions, such as
distribution of contraception, remains mired in ideological
controversies. Needless to say, the objections intensify when it
concerns the issue of abortion. For example, the Reproductive
Health in Refugee Situations: An Inter-Agency Field Manual
developed by the Inter-Agency Working Group on Refugee
Reproductive Health5 5 on the principles of the ICPD Program of
Agenda for the Right Time (International Women's Health Coalition, New
York, N.Y.), 1995, at 5
52. Beijing Platform, supra note14, 96.
53. See Beijing Platform, supra note 14, 109(i); see generally Mehilka
Hoodbhoy et al., Exporting Despair: The Human Rights Implications of U.S.
Restrictions on Foreign Health Care Funding in Kenya, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1 (2005) (noting Kenya's legal obligations set forth in the Beijing Platform, the
Mexico City Policy's impacts, and a loss of American aid to countries who
provide information about abortion).
54. See generally Beijing Platform, supra note 14, 224.
55. A second group titled Reproductive Health Response in Conflict
Consortium was also formed with the aim of achieving the goal of access to
reproductive health care through collaborative advocacy. See Increasing Access
to Quality Reproductive Health for Refugees and Internally Displaced People
Worldwide, RHRC CONSORTIUM, http://www.rhrc.org (last visited Feb. 2,
2015]
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Action and the Beijing Platform skirts the controversial issues
by mentioning disbursement of emergency contraception only
in the context of sexual violence and sets out the right to post
abortion care while avoiding any talk of abortion.6 The
politicized nature of the subject has led states to refrain from
defining and delineating what constitutes "sexual health" and
its intersection with "reproductive health". Further, the rise in
conservative politics has ensured that the discussion on
abortion and sexuality has been de-prioritized in favor of the
developmental agenda and promotion of economic growth.
International agencies, including the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), refuse to provide
succor to IDPs mainly because of the legal void they exist under
but also due to government reluctance to grant relief workers
access, financial considerations. In fact, donor funding has led
to fragmentation of the holistic notion of reproductive rights, 7
with each organization or private donor espousing only a
particular aspect of reproductive rights, rarely extending to
funding for abortion procedures. The need to maintain uniform
standards among care givers prompted the formulation of the
Sphere Minimum Standards,8  although there remains
ambiguity concerning a universal approach for all appropriate
service and care standards.5 9 Evaluations of the working of
these policy instruments have shown variable results. The
services provided within such documents are more likely to
trickle down to refugees in stable camp settings rather than
IDPs or those in new emergencies. Even those groups who have
access are more likely to have access to antenatal care rather
than clinical family planning services.
2015).
56. UNHCR, Reproductive Health in Refugee Situations: An Inter-Agency
Field Manual, 40-42 (1999).
57. See generally Germain & Kyte, supra note 51, at 9.
58. See THE SPHERE PROJECT: HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND MINIMUM
STANDARDS IN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE 4 (Phil Greaney et al. eds., 2011),
available at http://www.sphereproject.org/ (explaining how The Sphere Project
is a voluntary initiative that brings a wide range of humanitarian agencies
toward a common goal which is to improve the quality of humanitarian
assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents,
donors, and affected populations).
59. This work is being further developed by the UN's Humanitarian
Response Review since 2005, with the WHO playing a lead role in identifying
best practices and fostering inclusion at the local level.
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2. Treaty based provisions
Besides the policy instruments set out above, the
reproductive rights of women are encompassed by the major
UN human rights treaties, including the Convention on the
Elimination of All Sorts of Discrimination Against Women of
1979 ("CEDAW") and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966 ("ICESCR"). Refugees are
additionally entitled to the protection under the Convention on
the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention") of 1951 and its
1967 Protocol.60 Article 24(1)(b) of the Refugee Convention
requires contracting countries to extend to refugees with
"lawful status" the same benefits they extend to their
nationals, specifically matters of maternal health.6 1 Even if
refugees cannot meet the "lawful stay" criterion or receive
protection or coverage under the Refugee Convention, they are
entitled to the minimum guarantees that foreigners are
otherwise afforded by the concerned state [as per Article 7(1)]
and the UNHCR works to ensure the same." 2 This is of scarce
comfort, as restrictive domestic laws, religious impediments, or
lack of access can impair access to safe termination of
pregnancy and contraception. Lack of geographic accessibility
can also render these provisions meaningless, as demonstrated
in Colombia, where isolated communities have led to many
women being deprived of services, despite being citizens.63 A
reading of the provisions of the Refugee Convention would, on
the contrary, support the view that this agreement provides
protection to women as mothers, rather than to women seeking
to prevent motherhood. 4 Lawmakers appear to believe that the
object and purpose of maternal health and reproductive choice
has been attained if they succeed in providing women access to
60. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.. 137, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49daoe466.html; Protocol Relatina to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,606 U.N.T.S. 267, available at
http://www.unhCr.org/pages/49da0e466.html.
61. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 60, at art.
24(1)(b).
62. Francoise Girard & Wilhelmina Waldman, Ensuring the Reproductive
Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Legal and Policy Issues,
26 INT'L FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 4 (2000).
63. Austin et al., supra note 38Error! Bookmark not defined., at 13.
64. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 60.
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medical services to ensure safe delivery. The law attaches no
importance to the autonomy of women to decide, without guilt
or penalty, whether to terminate the pregnancy on account of
altered circumstances, during or post-conflict. The Syrian
conflict seems to support this hypothesis-Syrian women who
find themselves displaced by the conflict in neighboring
countries are subject to strict domestic anti-abortion laws. 5 In
fact, however, gender-based harm alone is not sufficient to
warrant grant of refugee status and often times women's
narratives may not fit the traditional definition of
persecution.
In contrast to the Refugee Convention, international
human rights treaties may be more widely extended to all
populations in need. In fact, Article 12 and 10(2) of ICESCR
guarantees reproductive health to all women, though couched
in terms of "special protection., 7 The treaty monitoring body
for the ICESCR has, in its General Comment on Article 12(2),
construed several provisions furthering the right to
reproductive health services, the right to prevent control and
treat diseases, and the right to health facilities and health
education, etc. 8 The Convention on the Rights of the Child,
1989 ("CRC") may also facilitate adolescent access to
information on sexual and reproductive health matters.6 9 These
treaty provisions, however, repeat the patriarchal approach of
promoting motherhood and refusal to admit the right of
abortion within the ambit of reproductive health and a
woman's autonomy over her body. Only the CEDAW
Committee partially deviates from this general trend. It
65. Ann Kumar, Women in Syria Need More Than Guided Missiles,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 13, 2013, 5:05 PM),
http ://www.huffingtonpost.com/anu-kumar/women-in-syria-need-more-
b 3922160.html (noting that Turkey is the only country in this region that
has a relaxed abortion framework).
66. See Rodger Haines, Gender-Related Persecution, in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 319, 320 (Erika Feller, Volker Thrk, &
Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).
67. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.un-
documents.net/icescr.htm.
68. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.
14 (2000): The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 22nd Sess.,
8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Comm. on Econ.,
Soc., and Cultural Rights].
69. Cf Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
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mandates that signatories address the specific health needs of
women and mandates women's decision-making autonomy in
matters of childbearing by virtue of Articles 12 and 16(1)(e).
70
The CEDAW Committee in its General Recommendation on
Article 12 stated that access to health care includes
reproductive healthcare of all women and girls irrespective of
status of residency or considerations of nationality. The
CEDAW Committee further refers to abortion outright when it
includes laws that criminalize and penalize medical procedures
required only by women.7' It also prohibits selective denial of
reproductive health procedures to women or any "conscientious
objection" to the same without referral to alternate means of
accessing such procedures .72  Through its General
Recommendation 30, the CEDAW Committee has further
bridged the divide between peacetime vis a vis access to
reproductive rights in times of conflict.73
Discussing the equality between men and women, the
Human Rights Committee ("HRC"), in its General Comment
28, called upon states to not subject women to unwanted
pregnancies or clandestine, unsafe abortion procedures.74 Once
again however, specific mention has been made of access to
abortion for women who have become pregnant as a result of
rape, thus perpetuating the status/event based classification
within a broader, more permissive framework. It is also easy
for state parties to circumvent the diktat of the General
Comment by citing culturally harmful practices such as sex
selection as a justification for prohibition on access to
abortion.5
The HRC also showed great support for therapeutic
abortions in the advisory opinion of KL v. Peru.76 The outcome
of the two challenges to Irish abortion laws by the Centere for
70. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).
71. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep.
on its 20th Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 5, 1999, at 9, U.N. Doe. A/54/38 (May 4, 1999).
72. Id. at 6.
73. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
supra note 24.
74. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The
Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), 68th Sess., at 10-11, U.N.
Doe. CCPR/C/2IIIRev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000).
75. Id. at 5.
76. See Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1153/2003, U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/ 2003 (Nov. 22, 2005).
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Reproductive Rights will additionally be crucial to determining
the HRC's stand on a woman's right to terminate non-viable
pregnancies without facing restrictive laws denying access by
requiring her to travel abroad.77
The recent Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted in
2003 (the "Maputo Protocol") specifies abortion as a right in its
article on reproductive health,8 as well as referring to member
states' obligation to incorporate a gender-specific policy,
legislation, development plans, and activities. 79 The inclusion of
these provisions and others pertaining to abolition of female
genital mutilation, provisions on marriage and divorce has
attracted the ire of several Catholic countries and has resulted
in heavy reservations and non-ratifications. 80 Even amidst
ratifying states, accountability and enforcement has been a
serious obstacle.8'
While the above enumeration of treaty provisions might
give the impression of the existence of a solid network of
interdependent and interconnected rights, albeit patriarchal in
focus and approach, the reality remains that poor enforcement,
non-ratification, and non-regulation of non-state parties and
non-binding nature of the opinion of treaty monitoring bodies
results in a weakening of this body of human rights law.82 Most
77. See Center for Reproductive Rights Brings Second Case Against
Ireland Abortion Laws Before the United Nations, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS (Mar. 13, 2014), http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/CRR-
brings-second-Ireland-case [hereinafter Center for Reproductive Rights].
78. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, art. 14, Sept. 13, 2000, CAB/LEG/66.6, available at
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-
protocol/achpr instr proto women eng.pdf [hereinafter Maputo Protocol].
Subsection (2)(c) of this article requires member states to "protect the
reproductive rights of women by authorizing medical abortion in cases of
sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers
the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the
fetus." Id.
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., Rachel Scheier, Rights Treaty in Uganda Snags on 'African
Values,' WENEWS, Jun 2. 2008, http://womensenews.org/story/080602/rights-
treaty-in-uganda-snags-african-values.
81. See Agnes Odhiambo & Gauri Van Gulik, Put a Spotlight on African
Women's Reproductive Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 20, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/20/put-spotlight-african-women-s-
reproductive-rights.
82. See, e.g., id; Center for Reproductive Rights, supra note 77; Scheier,
supra note 80.
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human rights instruments which contain rights protecting
women's reproductive autonomy also contain rights protecting
freedom of manifestation of religious belief as well preservation
of family life. Often this causes tension between rights
without a mechanism for reconciliation. Also, intense conflict
often results in the suspension of some of these rights, except
those that are non-derogable, at a time when they are required
the most or states may be unwilling/unable to enforce them.
There is sufficient evidence today that women experience
conflict different from men.5 This necessitates special rules
and regulations and the existing peacetime framework of rights• 86
fall short of catering to conflict situations. Though undeniably
the human rights regime has made more advances in
identifying women's special needs in comparison to
humanitarian law7 , it still needs to shift focus from sexual
violence, 8 or other forms of violence, 9 to varied experiences of
women during armed conflict.
B. LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT
Women's reproductive choices and the events that restrict
them during conduct of hostilities are governed by
83. See generally Anne 0' Rourke et al., Abortion and Conscientious
Objection: The New Battleground, 38 MONASH U.L. REV. 87, 88 (2012).
84. See Shelly Wright, Economic Rights and Social Justice: A Feminist
Analysis of Some International Human Rights Conventions, 12 AUSTL. Y.B.
INT'L. L. 241, 258 (1988-89).
85. See Beijing Platform, supra note 14, 135.
86. See generally Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving
Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 243,
248 (1994) (questioning whether rape as a tool of ethnic cleansing is unique,
worse than, or not comparable to other forms of rape in war or peace).
87. See generally Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions into
International Law, 19 ADEL. L. REV. 13, 15-18 (1997).
88. See International Comm. of the Red Cross, Aide-Memoire, 2, Dec. 3,
1992 available at http://digitalcase.case.edu:9000/fedora/get/ksl:mps17-
FaxBrehnanl99303300/mpsl7-FaxBrehnanl99303300.pdf. (last visited Sep.
18, 2014). It must be conceded however, that increasingly sexual violence and
specially rape is being recognized as very serious violation of international
humanitarian law. See, e.g., id.
89. The Moputo Protocol defines "violence against women" to include all
acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical,
sexual, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such
acts; or to undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation
of fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peace time or during
situations of armed conflict or war. Moputo Protocol, supra note 78, at art. 1(j).
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international humanitarian law.90 Feminist scholars have time
and again lamented the gendered hierarchy propagated by the
laws of armed conflict wherein rules dealing with or affecting
women are couched in the language of protection rather than
prohibition. 91 Furthermore, the breach of the rules pertaining
to women has not been given the status of 'grave breaches'
under the Geneva conventions. Progressive construction by the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") has
however resulted in inclusion of offences such as rape within
the phrase "wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health" appearing in the grave breaches section.92 The
protections under humanitarian law are applicable to varying
degrees depending on the nature of the conflict.
1. International armed conflict
The issue of reproductive health has not been specifically
addressed under the Geneva Conventions, despite there being
several provisions related to health in the third and fourth
conventions. The fourth convention, specifying duties and
responsibilities of an occupying power, entitles expectant
women and maternity cases to special assistance (Article 16-22)
and all women to protection against rape and indecent assault
90. International humanitarian law is the lex specialis, governing the
rights of women in conflict situations. See generally What Is International
Humanitarian Law?, ICRC,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what is ihl.pdf (July 2004).
91. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 76, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
92. See Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International
Humanitarian Law (Editorial Comment), 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 424, 426 (1993)
("The ICRC declared that the grave breach of 'wilfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health' (Article 147 of the fourth Geneva
Convention) covers rape."); also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, art.147 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. Similar interpretation
may be relied upon while reading Common Article 3 applicable to non-
international armed conflicts and the prohibition of "outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;... " See Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 7, at art.3. This might be construed as
including violence against women. See id. In fact Common Article 3 provisions
have been used to advocate against denial of abortion to women in times of
conflict. See id.
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(Article 27). 93 Once again, the law stops short of acknowledging
that events of war make the lack of ability to control
procreation or childbirth particularly hazardous for women.
Thus, while Article 59 of the fourth convention requires the
power occupying a territory to accept relief from the ICRC or
other relief agencies or power in case it finds itself unable to
provide such services to the populace under occupation, such
relief services rarely translate into the right to distribute
contraception or perform abortion procedure, even for war rape
survivors.94 This selective denial of abortion to female war rape
survivors while simultaneously providing male survivors and
rape victims the full range of medical care required by their
condition has been considered by the former head of the ICRC
Legal Division, Professor Louise Doswald-Beck as amounting to
unlawful discrimination or torture or cruel treatment under
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.95
Some vague provisions, such as Article 12 of the First and
Second Geneva Convention, which stipulate that "women shall
be treated with all consideration due to their sex," might have
been used to further the reproductive rights of women.9 6
However, the clarifications in the commentary circumscribe the
scope of such consideration to that required to be extended to
weaker beings in order to protect their modesty and respect.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Third Geneva Convention offers as
points for consideration in protection of women prisoners of war
the attributes of "weakness" "honor and modesty" and
"pregnancy and childbirth."97 Even in the calculation of
93. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 92, arts. 16-22, 27.
94. GLOBAL JUSTICE CTR., THE RIGHT TO AN ABORTION FOR GIRLS AND
WOMEN RAPED IN ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2011), available at
http://globaljusticecenter.net/index.php?option=com mtree&task=att downloa
d&link id=2&cf id=34 (highlighting the systematic omission by states and
internationally funded humanitarian organizations to provide abortion
services to women and girls raped in armed conflict).
95. GLOBAL JUSTICE CTR., UN SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES A HISTORIC
STAND SUPPORTING ABORTION ACCESS FOR WOMEN RAPED IN WAR 1 (2013),
available at http://globaljusticecenter.net/index.php/news-and-
events/news 1/press-releases/400-un-security-council-takes-a-historic-stand-
supporting-abortion-access-for-women-raped-in-war.
96. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31, art. 12 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 12 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention].
97. COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE To THE TREATMENT
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collateral damage and proportionality analysis, women are
overlooked, as commanders are not required to assess the long
term impact of attack on reproductive health of the female
population, or the extent of displacement likely to occur as a
result of aggression.
98
2. Non-international armed conflict
The laws of armed conflict are nebulous when it comes to
the domain of non-international armed conflicts or UN
peacekeeping operations. 99 In fact, "the international/internal
dichotomy has a gendered dimension because it underpins a
detailed legal regime protecting combatants in international
conflicts, almost invariably men, and a more general regime
offering considerably weaker and more contentious protection
to the civilian population, encompassing mostly women."100 The
contentious association of supposedly male attributes such as
active aggression, tenacity, ambition, competition and so-called
feminine attributes of passive and responsive compassion,
obedience etc. with normalcy and perpetuation of gender
stereotypes is perhaps the greatest failing of international
humanitarian law. Given the changing nature of armed conflict
and vast proliferation of civil wars in recent decades, the
disputed application of the law coupled with the double
standard of enforcement proves problematic as patterns of
human rights deprivations do not change across
internal/international conflicts. This is additionally
OF PRISONERS OF WAR art. 14, 2(2), at 147-48 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de
Henry trans., 1960).
98. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 406-10 (1993).
99. See Judith Gardam & Hilary Charlesworth, Protection of Women in
Armed Conflict, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 148, 157 (2000) ("The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has consistently argued for a broad
approach to the applicable law and regards all the provisions of IHL as
applicable when UN contingents resort to force, whether through
peacekeeping or peace enforcement forces."); also International Conference for
the Protection of War Victims, Report on the Protection of War Victims,
reprinted in 296 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 391, 428-29 (1993) ("[T]he limits
imposed on [action taken to 'ensure respect' for international humanitarian
law] are those of general international law, and that international
humanitarian law could not possibly provide a State not involved in the
conflict with a pretext for intervening militarily or for deploying forceful
measures outside the framework provided for by the United Nations
Charter.").
100. Charlesworth, supra note 2, at 389..
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troublesome since many practitioners and academics regard
legal principles inessential during armed conflict or repose
confidence in human rights law rather than armed conflict. 1 1
To sum up, the focus of laws of war has largely been on
criminalizing certain bodily harm and violence perpetrated on
women, 102 perpetuating the concept of women as victims of war
and circumscribing the need for protection by linking it in
many cases to actual or potential motherhood.0 3 The forty-
three provisions in the Geneva Conventions designed to protect
women, do so only in the context of their relationship with
others. In fact, nineteen of those provisions are designed to
protect children. 0 4 This co-mingling of the rights of the woman
and unborn child has been criticized as 'instrumentalizing'
women's bodies as insurers of the future generation 0 5 . This is
again reinforced in the understanding of rape as a crime only
when contextualized and couched in the language of sexual
violence- the law simply does not recognize right of victims of
ceremonial rape or survival rape the same way it seeks to
protect punitive rape. When not in the context of rape, violence
against women is penalized in the context of widespread,
systematic and large scale attack threatening the existence of
the community. For instance, the Statute of the International
Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
incorporates rape only as a crime against humanity. However,
101. See, e.g., Gardam & Charlesworth, supra note 99, at 157 ("The United
Nations, by contrast, continues to maintain its longstanding view that it is
bound by the 'fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian
law.").
102. Article 27(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention supports this analysis.
The provision very clearly identifies rape as an attack against the honor of the
woman. The object appears to be punishing men for disobeying the mandates
of military discipline and code of honor rather than focusing on the harm
caused to the woman. See generally Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 92,
art. 27(2).
103. See, e.g., Beijing Platform, supra note 14, 93, 268.
104. See, e.g., MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 470 (1982).
105. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Integration of
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against
Women, Addendum: Mission to Bangladesh, Nepal and India on the Issue of
Trafficking of Women and Girls, delivered to the U.N. Comm'n on Human
Rights, 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73/Add.2 (Feb. 6, 2001) (stating that it is
important to maintain conceptual clarity in separating the regimes that
operate for women from those that operate for children, and that women are
adults and should be treated as such in laws, policies and programs).
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prosecutorial policy of charging offenders with war crimes has
remedied this deficiency to a certain extent. 10 6 Even within this
limited context, there is overwhelming international pressure
to water down the definition of such offences and the liability
they attract.
The problem of contextualizing international humanitarian
law in a way that it addresses women's experiences is
obstructed not merely by the gender differences that it ignores
but also by the fact that the laws of war attempts to distinguish
between combatant and non-combatant, with the former
function receiving greater focus regulation wise and the latter
receiving focus from the perspective of need for protection 10 7 . As
men are more commonly associated with combatant status, this
perpetuates the gender differences without overtly appearing
to do so- thus conferring upon women a double disability.
0 8
Also, since the rules of armed conflict originated with the
intent to regulate conflicts in the Western world, attempting to
extend them to conflicts worldwide makes the exercise of
making such laws gender specific more difficult. 09
C. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
The idea of individual criminal accountability at the
international level has been well received by feminists who
favor international enforcement mechanisms as more
'hospitable' to women's needs than domestic mechanisms.
Vociferous lobbying by women's rights groups has ensured that
several gender specific provisions have been incorporated in the
Statute of the International Criminal Court and to varying
degrees by other international and ad-hoc tribunals."0 This
106. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, its Consequences, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/54 (Feb. 29, 2000).
107. See generally Mala Tabory, The Status of Women in Humanitarian
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 941 (Yoram Dinstein
ed., 1988).
108. Gardam & Jarvis, supra note 10, at 6.
109. See Christophe Swinarski, Regional Perspectives on International
Humanitarian Law, in SHELTERS FROM THE STORM: DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 323 (William Malley ed., 1995).
110. See generally Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in
the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal
Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2009) (assessing the ideological and political
investments that feminists brought to the statutes of international criminal
tribunals and the ICC).
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development, according to many, forestalls the need for formal
amendment of the deficiencies in the laws of armed conflict.
However as most humanitarian law principles are customary,
formal amendments are rarely at issue. A more prudent
approach would be to ensure that future evolution of such
customary principles occur through the spectrum of gender
inclusivity. It must further be borne in mind that international
criminal law is much more limited in its scope and coverage
than humanitarian law, which continues to remain a
touchstone governing conduct of hostilities. Certainly
international law is a long way away from criminalizing
agents/perpetrators that impede free exercise of reproductive
choices by women.
Both humanitarian and human rights law needs to
reinforce the understanding that acquisition of a formal right
does not automatically translate into solution of discriminatory
practices. This is especially true for rights applicable only to
women such as reproductive rights or right to choose an
abortion. An understanding of competing rights interests is
also essential in order to ensure that discrepancies and
conflicts within bodies of laws are rooted out. Occasionally
achieving rights realization in one area leads to deprivation in
other, e.g. the difficulties in reconciling right of conscientious
objection and reproductive freedom.
Having set out the extant protections under the various
legal regimes and the inconsistencies and loopholes within
them, which have made reproductive justice illusory for
women, this article shall now proceed to examine the recent
Resolution 2122, which has been heralded as a
"groundbreaking resolution supporting abortion services for
girls and women raped in armed conflict.""' This next section
attempts to detail the aims and ambitions of Resolution 2122
and analyze what progressive contribution, if any, it makes to
the field of reproductive justice. It applies feminist methods of
interpreting international law to adjudge whether Resolution
2122 sheds the patriarchal cloak and truly embraces
reproductive justice in a holistic way.
111. See GLOBAL JUSTICE CTR., supra note 94Error! Bookmark not
defined.. See generally S.C. Res. 2122, supra note [1].
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IV. RESOLUTION 2122: USHERING IN CHANGE
The unanimously adopted Resolution 2122 attempts to
ensure workability of Resolution 1325 and promotes women's
engagement in and occupation of leadership positions in
conflict resolution and peace building. 112 Resolution 2122 is
aimed at substantially strengthening measures for women's
participation in "conflict prevention, resolution and
peacebuilding," and building women's "engagement in all levels
of decision-making." 1 3 It also recognizes several factors that
contribute to vulnerability of women during conflict and post-
conflict situations such as unequal citizenship rights, gender
biased application of asylum laws, and forced displacement.
Resolution 2122 reaffirms that "women's and girls'
empowerment and gender equality are critical to efforts to
maintain international peace and security," and expresses
continuing concern about "persistent implementation deficits in
the women, peace and security agenda, including in: protection
from human rights abuses and violations; opportunities for
women to exercise leadership; resources provided to address
their needs and which will help them exercise their rights; ...
," Resolution 2122 expresses, while simultaneously seeking to
address, many of the pressing concerns of the feminist and
human rights advocates lobbying for gender specific legal
provisions that account for women's special needs in times of
conflict and post conflict social vacuum. It furthers the agenda
of building institutional resistance to militarization by
fostering inclusiveness, gender sensitivity and greater
bargaining power to women during negotiations for peace and
post conflict society regeneration with the object of encouraging
demilitarization.
5
Of all the forward looking statements manifested in
Resolution 2122 however, reproductive rights activists are
particularly jubilant that Resolution 2122 notes, for the first
time, the need "for access to the full range of sexual and
112. See S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1; S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
113. S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1.
114. Id.
115. See generally Gwyn Kirk, Contesting Militarization, in SECURITY
DISARMED: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER, RACE AND MILITARIZATION
30, 65 (Barbara Sutton, Sandra Morgen and Julie Novkov eds., 2008)
(discussing ways to contest militarization, but not referencing S.C. Res. 2122
specifically).
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reproductive health services, including regarding pregnancies
resulting from rape, without discrimination, ... " for women in
conflict and post conflict re-building. 116 The statement is, in
large part, the outcome of the September 4, 2013 "Report of the
Secretary-General on women and peace and security," wherein
he stressed the need to address "all physical, mental and sexual
and reproductive health consequences of violence against
women, including through provision of emergency
contraception and safe abortion where permitted by national
law." 17 The UN Women Executive Director declared that
Resolution 2122 is an "extraordinary addition to our ever-
evolving global norms, and pushes the normative envelope with
new language on the need for the full range of sexual and
reproductive health care services for women .... ,,"8 Thus,
while gains had not been as consistent or sustained as
envisioned in the goals set at the Secretary-General's Seven-
Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding,"19
Resolution 2122 ushers in hope of "a 'new generation' of
gender-responsive mediation practice."20 It is hoped that
Resolution 2122 will prompt humanitarian aid donors, such as
the United States, to create exceptions to the Helms
Amendment which currently restricts the use of aid for
abortion related services.'2 '
Resolution 2122 seems to be making a conscious effort
towards shedding the patriarchal approach viewing women as
victims in the context of reproductive rights. It reveals the
Security Council's commitment to reducing women's
vulnerabilities in armed conflict situations and addressing
116. S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1.
117. See Ban Ki-moon Report, supra note 20.
118. Statement of UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka
on adoption of Security Council Resolution 2122, UN WOMEN (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/10/ed-statement-on-sc-
resolution-on-women-and-peacebuilding.
119. See U.N. Secretary-General, Women's Participation in Peacebuilding:
Rep. of the Secretary-General, 27-52A/65/354-S/2010/466 (Sep. 7, 2010)
[hereinafter Report on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding].
120. Security Council Adopts Resolution 2122 (2013), Aiming to Strengthen
Women's Role in All Stages of Conflict Prevention, Resolution, RELIEF WEB 2
(Oct. 20, 2013), http://reliefweb.int/report/world/security-council-adopts-
resolution-2122-2013-aiming-strengthen-womens-role-all-stages.
121. Sneha Barot, Abortion Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid: The History
and Harms of the Helms Amendment, 16 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 3, 9 (2013).
The Helms Amendment formed Section 104(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961. Its current, amended, from Se tion 2151b(f) of Title 22 of the United
States Code. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f).
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sexual and gender based discriminations in times of conflict 22
During negotiations, caution was advised against viewing
women merely as victims of abuse rather than leaders of
change as "viewing them exclusively through that lens because
it constituted another form of gender discrimination. ,123 The
Resolution attempts to address several shortcomings and
strengthen several core areas highlighted in its predecessor
Resolution 1325 whose transformative aims continue to be
debated.24 Particularly, it diverts the focus from protecting
women as vulnerable victims of sexualized violence to creating
a space for a "broader range of conflict-related gender-based
harms to be recognized, documented and addressed."
125
Undeniably, Resolution 2122 attempts to move away from the
strictly patriarchal understanding of women as cultural objects
or as bodies on and through which war can be waged through
acts such as rape 12 to an understanding of rape as something
that affects and shapes women's experiences directly. Where
earlier instruments stopped short of advocating for
reproductive justice for women war rape victims and merely
called for prosecution of offenders, Resolution 2122 attempts to
confer upon women greater agency to decide their destinies.
Definitely, it is more expansive than many recently negotiated
instruments, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, which merely
exhorts arms exporting states to account for the risks of the
conventional arms in the commission or facilitation of "serious
acts of gender violence or serious acts of violence against
women and children."127 Most significantly, Resolution 2122
does not circumscribe its provision on reproductive justice by
122. See generally U.N. SCOR, 7044th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/PV.7044 (Oct. 18,
2013) [hereinafter Statements by the Delegates].
123. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Adopts Resolution
2122 (2013), Aiming to Strengthen Women's Role in All Stages of Conflict
Prevention, Resolution; Senior Officials Brief on Progress, Challenges to
Implementing Landmark Text, U.N. Press Release SC/11149 2 (Oct. 18, 2013).
124. See generally Bartlett et al., supra note 35.
125. Aisling Swaine, Substantive New Normative Provisions on Women and
Armed Conflict Concurrently Adopted by the United Nations Security Council
and the CEDAW Committee, 18 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 5, 8 (2014), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/5/substantive-new-normative-
provisions-women-and-armed-conflict.
126. Maria Eriksson, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS
FOR STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?, Raul Wallenberg Institute
Human Rights Library, Volume 38 (155).
127. The Arms Trade Treaty art. 7(4), Dec. 24, 2014, 13 U.N.T.S 27217,
available at https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.conwp-
content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.
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making it subservient to national legal provisions.
"Guatemala .... expressly noted.., that because [Resolution
2122] itself did not include language specifically
contextualizing this provision in line with national legislation,
they were prevented from cosponsoring it."
1 28
However, despite the above, a perusal of Resolution 2122
and a report of the deliberations reveal that the focus is
predominantly about fostering women's leadership roles in the
peacemaking process 129 and not about reproductive rights. The
provision featuring reproductive and sexual choices of women
raped in conflict appears in the preamble to Resolution 2122
and it is preceded by the word "notes" rather than "reaffirms"
or "recognizes," 30 indicating an absence of forcefulness and
enforceability. Of all the countries whose statements were
recorded during the 7044th meeting deliberating the adoption of
Resolution 2122, only Switzerland, Slovenia, and the
Netherlands expressly recognized the importance of access to
safe abortion for women and girls who are victims of rape. 3' It
is amply clear that the majority of countries relegated this
provision to a position of obscurity. In addition, Resolution
2122 makes little new inroad to advancing women's
reproductive and sexual health. In the subsequent section, this
article extrapolates the various ways in which Resolution 2122
failed to advance women's access to choice.
V. RESOLUTION 2122: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
Resolution 2122 is commendable for being the first UNSC
resolution that recognizes the need to specifically set out rights
addressing women's reproductive health in conflict and post
conflict situations. Rights available to women in times of 'peace'
cannot be effectively accessed by communities ravaged by
armed conflict without a workable nexus between
humanitarian responses mobilized by international
128. Swaine, supra 125, at 10.
129. See Statements by the Delegates, supra note 122, at 4-6.
130. S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1, at 2.
131. Statement by the Delegates, supra note 122, at 41-42, 45-46, 64
(stating that of the three counties, only Switzerland specifically used the word"abortion" and reiterated a woman's right to have control over her own body,
free from coercion). Slovenia welcomed the reference to the "need for access to
a full range of sexual and reproductive health services." Id. at 45. Tthe
Netherlands spoke of access to services for the safe termination of pregnancies
resulting from rape. Id. at 64.
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humanitarian law and the understanding of the non-derogable
nature of human rights standards in times of conflict. This
must be further buttressed by explicitly tailoring the right to
reproductive health available in times of 'peace' to the special
circumstances and events women find themselves confronting
during conflict and ensuring that the right evolves accordingly,
all of which Resolution 2122 attempts to do. However, the
rhetoric of Resolution 2122 seems non-committal to the cause of
reproductive justice, particularly in light of the fact that the
issue of sexual and reproductive health of women has been
addressed more substantively by several other UN bodies. 32
The UN Commission on the Status of Women in its fifty-
seventh session highlighted the need to ensure the
prioritization and effective redress of all forms of violence
against women in conflict and post conflict situations through
several means, including "affordable and accessible health-care
services, including sexual and reproductive health."133 It
unambiguously states that women and girls' health concerns
can be addressed by ensuring access to mental health support,
emergency contraception, safe abortion (where permitted by
national law), post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV infection, and
134more.
One might argue that the language of Resolution 2122
serves to remove the requirement that abortion procedures be
legally permitted under national law in order to be accessible.
However, it seems to do more to cripple the right to access
abortion and other health services by limiting it to war rape
victims. 3 5 Nevertheless, it seems to assert that this category of
women, ravaged and victimized by conflict deserve a category
of entitlement more privileged and special. Moreover, it
perpetuates the same event-based criteria as opposed to a need
based one that feminist scholars consistently object to. It vests
lawmakers with the power to espouse the cause of one class of
women over another and assign greater relief to some and
chooses to categorize women as victims of armed conflict rather
than stakeholders in the process, thereby going against its
fundamental premise. In contrast, the language adopted by the
CEDAW Committee in General Recommendation 30 calls upon
member states to ensure that access to sexual and reproductive
132. See generally Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 105.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id. at 14-16.
135. See generally S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1, at 2.
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health is inclusive within the unqualified right to access safe
abortion services as well as post abortion care. 36 Furthermore,
it specifically states that refugees and displaced women be
granted equal right of access and participation in distribution• 137
of supplies.
The facially apparent shortcomings discussed above
warrant a more thorough examination of Resolution 2122. In
the subsequent paragraphs, this article discusses the myriad
ways in which Resolution 2122 not only fails to advance, but
actually interferes with women's enjoyment of reproductive
rights.
A. THE NEED TO RE-CONTEXTUALIZE CONFLICT
Resolution 2122 in typical paternalistic fashion fails to
take into account that "conflict and attacks are themselves
contingent and controversial." 38  Indeed, the blurry line
between conflict, post-conflict, and "peace" has proved
problematic for women in the past. In general, 'peace' has been
understood as cessation of 'official' hostilities by male
belligerents. 39 This has rendered violence perpetrated against
women post official declaration of peace invisible for failing to
rise to the threshold of "conflict". For instance, Cynthia Enloe
has researched the conditions prevailing in several military
bases where women are coerced into prostitution post formal
cessation of hostilities. 4 0 The sexual abuses perpetrated by UN
peacekeepers themselves have also been well documented,
which exposes the "unreality of the conflict/peace dichotomy"
4'
wherein persons entrusted with enforcing 'peace' are theS 142
perpetrators of violence. In fact, the need to address problems
of sex discrimination even during 'peacetime' if war time
exploitations are to be avoided, is gaining increasing
136. Accord Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
supra 24, at 14.
137. Id. at 14-16.
138. Charlesworth, supra note 2, at 389.
139. See Lori Handrahan, Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 4, 429-430 (2004).
140. See CYNTHIS ENLOE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEXUAL POLITICS AT THE
END OF THE COLD WAR 118-20 (1993).
141. Charlesworth, supra note 2, at 390.
142. See, e.g., Anne Oxford, The Politics of Collective Security, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 373, 377-79 (1996).
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recognition.
143
Resolution 2122 does not specify the exact temporal and
spatial limits of 'conflict' and 'post conflict' situations vis a vis
peacetime, and thus does not clarify under what circumstances
women are entitled to the broad range of sexual and
reproductive health services Resolution 2122 envisages.
Further, as demarcated by Christine Bell, post conflict peace
negotiations take place across three phases: pre-negotiation
agreements, substantive / framework agreements, and
implementation agreements 4 4 Each phase brings with it
unique complications for women. While the pre-negotiation
agreement, and the substantive / framework agreement
phase, 45 focuses on the public political-legal spheres and
synonymously the visible forms of gender violence and
reproductive harm, it ignores the private violence occurring
within the sphere of the home. 46 The actual peace treaty rarely
translates into trade-offs for the women in the implementation
phase and the prevailing sentiment that war is over results in
major reduction in funding and closing up of fund channels.
47
This may make the aims of Resolution 2122 unachievable in
the post-conflict situation it articulates so blithely. Thus the
movement to end disparity in status during times of stability is
a sine qua non to achieving reforms in law that affect women's
experiences during war time.
In contrast, the CEDAW Committee in its General
Recommendation 30 clarifies the broad range of conflict-like
circumstances under which it operates. 4 8 This reflects a shift
143. See generally Charlesworth, supra note 2.
144. CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND
THE LEX PACIFICATORIA 56-63 (2008).
145. The pre-negotiation agreement and substantive / framework
agreement phases are characterized by domination by belligerents and
military men and women rarely participate in the discussion and decision
making process.
146. Charlesworth, supra note 2, at 382-88 (discussing the private / public
distinction).
147. See Fionnuala D. Ni Aolain, Advancing Women's Rights in Conflict
and Post Conflict Situations, 104 AM. SOC. INT'L. L. PROC. 568, 570 (2010).
148. See Recommendation No. 30, supra note 24, at 2 ("The general
recommendation covers the application of the Convention to conflict
prevention, international and non-international armed conflicts, situations of
foreign occupation, as well as other forms of occupation and the post-conflict
phase. In addition, the recommendation covers other situations of concern,
such as internal disturbances, protracted and low-intensity civil strife,
political strife, ethnic and communal violence, states of emergency and
suppression of mass uprisings, war against terrorism and organized crime,
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towards the feminist demand to classify conflict-like situations
as "humanitarian emergencies." It also displays sensitivity to
and awareness of the changing nature of conflict itself, from
traditional face-offs between opposing military forces involving
conventional weapons to "low-intensity" conflicts deliberately
targeting the civilian population, of which women comprise a
considerable majority. It further states that the "phases of
conflict and post-conflict have at times been divided as they can
encompass different challenges and opportunities for
addressing the human rights of women and girls" and makes
clear the CEDAW Committee's awareness of the cyclical nature
of transition of societies from conflict to post-conflict
situations.49
However, neither instrument recognizes the violence that
continues against women in the post-conflict breakdown of law
and order, 15 0 and the need to distinguish both these categories
from women's human rights in times of so called peace. Thus,
in direct contradiction to these artificially contrived differences
between conflict and non-conflict situations which these texts
perpetuate, scholars advocate for an understanding of violence
perpetrated against women as a continuum. 5 ' Also, there is a
need to understand the complex interaction of "ordinary"
domestic violence with conflict exacerbated communal tensions
or other institutional or informal violence spurred by conflict,
5 2
and to address both when attempting to create a reproductive
rights paradigm applicable to conflict ridden societies.
Acknowledging a multi-layered concept of violence, where pre-
existing violence escalates and explodes onto a superstructure
of intense violence engineered by the conflict and consisting of
honor killings, forced pregnancy, rape, sexual abuse is vital for
the success of these aspirational aims set out in the
instruments.
that may not necessarily be classified as armed conflict under international
humanitarian law and which result in serious violations of women's
rights ....").
149. See Recommendation No. 30, supra note 24, at 2.
150. See generally S.C. Res. 2122 supra note 1; Recommendation No. 30,
supra note 24.
151. See Margaret Urban Walker, Gender and Violence in Focus: A
Background for Gender Justice, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS:
UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 28-33 (Ruth Rubio Marin ed., 2009).
152. See Aolain, supra note 18, at 11-14.
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B. INCONSISTENCY WITH CEDAW
The General Recommendation 30 of the CEDAW
Committee calls for expansive reforms and progressive
measures to achieve protection of women's human rights at all
times, while "advancing substantive gender equality before,
during and after conflict and ensuring that women's diverse
experiences are fully integrated into all peace building,
peacemaking, and reconstruction processes ... ,,153 The
Committee recognizes that the various thematic resolutions of
the Security Council operate in the same area of removing
obstructions to women and ensuring equality in the context of
conflict, peace and security. It therefore "reiterates the need for
a concerted and integrated approach that places the
implementation of the Security Council agenda on women,
peace and security into the broader framework of the
implementation of the Convention and its Optional Protocol."
5 4
Given that the provision of the Resolution 2122 is more
restrictive than the provision of General Recommendation 30,
it is possible that states encounter a real difficulty when
attempting to reconcile and integrate the two instruments. If
reproductive freedom and access is to be explicated as available
only to war rape victims, the legitimacy of the CEDAW
provisions which make it available to all women affected by
conflict and post conflict chaos is questionable. This possible
shift to a more restrictive regime is thus very discouraging. In
fact this narrower tailoring of the idea of reproductive rights
would allow less supportive states to postpone legislations or
policy favoring reproductive rights for all women on basis of
need.
C. MASCULINITY AND ITS IMPACT ON WOMEN
While, undeniably, the aim of Resolution 2122 is to bring
women's roles and contributions in conflict and post-conflict
societies to the forefront, it does great disservice to the women
it seeks to protect by ignoring the masculine nature of
humanitarian interventions and the emergence of masculine
trends in times of armed conflict. 5 5 Resolution 2122 recognizes
153. Recommendation No. 30, supra note 24, at 2.
154. Id. at 7.
155. See generally Naomi Cahn & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Gender,
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that women's vulnerability is exacerbated in conflict and they
are placed at an increased risk of sexual and gendered violence.
However, it does not attempt to understand the placement of
men both within the domestic context as well as those
international players with a stake in the crisis in "creation,
perpetration and institutionalization of violence, "  as crucial
to predicting the trends in crisis solving and redressing victim
harm. In today's post-modern conflict, understanding and
addressing disparities involves not only woman victims but also
men in power. 15 7 However, Resolution 2122 fails to do so.
Furthermore, hyper-masculinity plays an inflated role in
158humanitarian crises, whether through causal connection or
precipitation. Many women's human rights advocates are
calling for a deeper analysis of the phenomenon. '9 This is
especially relevant in the attempts to re-characterize women's
experiences during and post conclusion of hostilities.
Additionally, the rebuttal of the presumption that masculinity
is "neutralized" in times of humanitarian emergencies is of
utmost importance in order to explain the increased
subjugation of women in conflict stricken societies, where men
might substitute loss of power in the external/public sphere
with increased exercise of power over women. Given Resolution
2122's focus on redistributing power to women, especially in
the public sphere, as well as granting women more space in
decision making and leadership functions, ignoring trends in
hyper-masculinity that might potentially inhibit such
participation makes Resolution 2122 appear incomplete and
hastily pieced together.
Lastly, the effect of projection of masculinity on women in
times of conflict has generated considerable interest in recent
times, and warrants inclusion in future UNSC thematic
resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. Women's increased
militarization and adoption of androcentric attitudes has led to
Masculinities and Transition in Conflicted Societies, 44 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1
(2010) (discussing 'hyper" masculinity in conflict and peacebuilding).
156. See id. at 5.
157. See Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice,
52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 793 (2000).
158. See, e.g., Statements by the Delegates, supra note 122, at 15-17.
Hyper-masculinity is understood to be "a masculinity in which the strictures
against femininity and homosexuality are especially intense and in which
physical strength and aggressiveness are paramount. See Harris, supra note
157, at 793 (quoted in Cahn & Aolain, supra note 155, at 5).
159. See, e.g., Statements by the Delegates, supra note 122, at 15-17.
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their assumption of non-traditional roles, which is what the
resolutions seek to promote. 16 0 However by adopting masculine
norms by deliberately shunning all that is feminine, most
women have found themselves caught in a prism of a different
kind of victimhood and have retained patriarchal gender
hierarchies.1'' This new kind of victimhood, different from the
victimhood women suffer as civilians, needs to be recognized
and redressed, possibly through the periodic review and
reporting of the progress of Resolution 2122.
D. CULTURAL AND GEOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES
When Resolution 2122 states the need "for access to the
full range of sexual and reproductive health services" it does
not take into account the cultural and geographic barriers
existing worldwide that might render implementation
illusory. 6 2 Not even during the debate were the realities of
conflicting cultural practices deliberated upon and no one
commented on the palpable possibility that for some state
parties the implementation of the provision will prove more
difficult than others. For instance, several commentators have
noticed that the African Charter on Human and People's Rights
from 1981 (the African Charter) has made rights of women
more unattainable by emphasizing the community needs,
which constitutes a very important aspect of African way of
life. 16 3 During deliberations, several delegates highlighted the
recurrence of widespread and systematic conflicts in the
African continent,1 4 but expressed no qualms about the
provisions of the African Charter that serve to devalue the very
experiences of women that Resolution 2122 seeks to address.
Notably, Article 17(3) of the African Charter states that "[tihe
160. See Noya Rimalt, Women in the Sphere of Masculinity: The Double-
Edged Sword of Women's Integration in the Military, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y. 1097, 1098 (2007).
161. Id. at 1113-15.
162. See S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1, at 2.
163. See, e.g., Christof Heyns, African Regional Human Rights System: The
African Charter, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 679, 688-689 (2003-2004). See
generally African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU
Doe. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].
164. See, e.g., Statements by the Delegates, supra note 122, at 7-9
(statement by Ms. Balipou, highlighting the gravity of the two decade long
crisis in the Central African Republic which has spiraled "out of control" into a
full blown conflict situation causing immeasurable harm to women).
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promotion and protection of morals and traditional values
recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State."6
Article 18 entrusts the family with custody of those morals and
values, describing it as "the natural unit and basis of society."6
The same article requires that discrimination against women
be eliminated but juxtaposes the same with protection of
"familial" and "traditional" values situating state parties to
both instruments in a precarious position indeed. 6 7 This is not
to suggest that UN instruments view the family as a source of
oppression.18 Rather, it is to suggest that they recognize the
obstacles it may present in realization of reproductive
autonomy for women at the individual level and by necessary
implication, women as a class.
Likewise, countries use local practices such as sex selection
to deny extension of abortion rights to women.1 9 Resolution
2122 does nothing to de-link the two phenomena, precisely
because of the narrow window of war rape victims through
which it approaches the issue. While it is not expected that
Resolution 2122 would account for country-specific cultural
practices that might act as hindrance to women's reproductive
freedom in conflict and post conflict hiatus, it does need to be
acknowledged that this cultural relativism operates as a
deterrent to states looking to implement the UNSC Women and
Peace and Security Agenda. It fails to acknowledge that both de
jure and de facto discrimination against women are repeatedly
justified by governments on the basis of culture, religion or
ethnicity. When relativism completely wipes out the notion of
universality and indivisibility of rights it serves "to obscure
violations committed against women, to perpetuate an
ideological resistance to the notion of women's human rights
and to inhibit a unified response from the internationalcommunity. It is not enough therefore that Resolution 2122
165. African Charter, supra note 163, at art. 17.
166. See id. at art. 18.
167. See id.
168. In fact, Black Asian feminists have cautioned against viewing the
family as a source of oppression. See Valerie Amos & Pratibha Parmar,
Challenging Imperial Feminism, 17 FEM. REV. 3, 15 (1984) (illustrating the
difference among feminists from different cultural and ethnical backgrounds).
169. See generally Fred Arnold, Sunita Kishor & T.K. Roy, Sex Selective
Abortions in India, 28 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 759, 762-63 (discussing sex
selective abortions in India).
170. See ASIA PACIFIC FORUM OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS,
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS: A
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obliterates the requirement that abortion be carried out only
when permitted under national law, the resolution should
extrapolate more on how divergent national interests may be
reconciled in such a manner that women's reproductive health
concerns do not take second place when balanced against other
competing interests.
E. RESOLUTION 2122 AND THE HELMS AMENDMENT
The adoption of Resolution 2122 led to widespread
advocacy efforts demanding the United States government to
clarify or repeal the Helm's Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act passed in 1973,171 which forbids foreign aid
recipients from using United States funding to perform
abortions "as a method of family planning" or "to motivate or
coerce any person to practice abortions.""2 Spearheaded by the
Centre for Health and Gender Equity, an advocacy group, and
Human Rights Watch, the campaigns focus on making foreign
humanitarian aid available for victims of war rape, relying on
Resolution 2122.173 The Helms Amendment, an outdated
enactment, forbids utilization of United States aid to "pay for
the performance of abortion as a method of family planning,"
but does not prohibit U.S. foreign assistance in cases of rape,
incest, or life endangerment. 74 Despite the distinction, lack of
MANUAL FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 16 (June 2014).
171. See Sera Sippel, Women, Abortion and Helms: Executive Action to
Break Barriers, THE WORLD POST (Jan. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/serra-sippel/women-abortion-and-
helms b 4604176.html.
172. The Helms Amendment, in its current form, provides: "(1) None of the
funds made available to carry out subchapter I of this chapter may be used to
pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning or to
motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions. (2) None of the funds
made available to carry out subchapter I of this chapter may be used to pay for
the performance of involuntary sterilizations as a method of family planning
or to coerce or provide any financial incentive to any person to undergo
sterilizations. (3) None of the funds made available to carry out subchapter I
of this chapter may be used to pay for any biomedical research which relates,
in whole or in part, to methods of, or the performance of, abortions or
involuntary sterilization as a means of family planning." 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f).
173. See Center for Health and Gender Equity, New Campaign Calls on
Obama Administration to Support Access to Safe, Voluntary Abortion Services
for Women and Girls Raped in Crisis or Conflict (Dec. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/Break the Barriers News Release.
pdf, last visited on March 23, 2014.
174. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f).
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clarity around the implementation of Helms has served as a
barrier to post-rape care in conflict and crisis. This is
notwithstanding the several initiatives of the Obama
administration since 2011, including the issuance of an
executive order, the U.S. National Action Plan on Women,
Peace and Security, which sought to "protect women from
sexual and gender-based violence and to ensure equal access to
relief and recovery assistance."75
While such advocacy efforts are commendable, they also
serve as a double-edged sword. The aim of the movement is to
get the United States government to retract from the over-
interpretative stance that it has taken with regard to the
Helms Amendment restriction. However, the Helms
Amendment in reality has always provided for relaxation to the
funding restriction beyond rape to cases of incest and life-
endangerment. 76 On the contrary, it is Resolution 2122 which
suffers from the fault of under-inclusiveness by extending
reproductive and sexual health care only to victims of rape.
Fault is apparent in the distribution analysis undertaken by
these advocacy groups on account of war rape being the crisis
or variable upon which reformist agenda is being hinged rather
than life endangerment or similar need based criteria. 7 7 This
approach might win short term victories, but in the long term
will lead to great losses in bringing the reproductive rights
agenda to fruition. By drawing the international communities'
attention to the war rape criteria, the life risk exception is
being rendered obsolete. The Helms Amendment has
disproportionate impact on the lives of impoverished women in
comparison to men, 7 8 and this cannot be addressed in totality
by brandishing Resolution 2122, which perpetuates the
paternalistic attitudes of male policy makers to women's
human rights.
175. See United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and
Security, THE WHITE HOUSE, December 2011, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-
files/US National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security.pdf.
176. See generally Sneha Barot, Abortion Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid:
The History and Harms of the Helms Amendment, 16.3 GUTTMACHER POL'Y.
REV. 9, 9-13 (2013), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/16/3/gpr160309.pdf.
177. See GLOBAL JUSTICE CTR., supra note 94 (observing that foreign aid is
used in the treatment of war-rape victims).
178. See Jessica Mack, The Helms Amendment is America's Foreign Policy
Skeleton in the Closet, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.aljazeera.conmindepth/opinion/2013/04/201343104350559475.html.
2015]
212 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 24:2
F. CONTEXTUALIZING RESOLUTION 2122 WITHIN FEMINIST
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Having highlighted the areas in which Resolution 2122
falls short of realizing full and fair reproductive justice for
women caught in conflict, it would be pertinent to analyze the
language of Resolution 2122 in the context of feminist
jurisprudence to assess its conformity with common feminist
approaches to international law. This section identifies three
broad approaches advanced by feminist scholars and attempts
to draw parallels with the approach embodied in Resolution
2122.
Feminist scholars who critique the content of the human
rights instruments remark that the limited participation of
women in all stages of the formal peace negotiation process acts
as a stumbling block to meaningful inclusion of women's
human rights in the post conflict society. 79 By virtue of their
exclusion from the formal decision making process, women are"unable to draw attention to the particular difficulties they
experience in conflict situations and, moreover, are powerless
to recommend any preventive action."80 Women excluded from
the decision prompting the commencement of as well as
signaling the end of hostilities cannot rightly be required to live
with the consequences. This idea has been propagated since
1993, with mention of integration of the human rights of
women into UN's system wide activity in the Vienna
Declaration and in the Beijing Platform in 1994 which declared
its intention to "[ilncrease the participation of women in
conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protect women
living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under
foreign occupation ....
This approach is clearly echoed in Resolution 2122 as well
as its predecessor Resolution 1325, which recognize that
civilians, specifically women and children are adversely
affected by armed conflict and attempts to end the
marginalization of women from the decision making processes
179. See, e.g., Myanmar: Tackling Impunity for Rape and Women's
Entitlement to Bodily Integrity, 47 Women's World 8, 11-12, (2013), available
at http://www.isis-wicce.org/sites/default/files/resource-
field-document/Women's%20World%20Magazine%202014%20septl.pdf.
180. See Judith Gardam, Women, Human Rights, and International
Humanitarian Law, 324 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 421, 422 (1998).
181. See Beijing Platform, supra note 14, 141.
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that affect the affairs of the State. 82 In fact Resolution 2122
goes further than its predecessor by focusing not only on
women's participation but also on promoting women in
leadership positions. 83
On the other hand, an equally forceful but contrary
argument is made out by those who study the marginalization
of women from the perspective of the feminist standpoint
theory.8 4 Since gender based violence and reproductive harms
suffered by women occur mostly within the private realm,
unresolved questions remain whether effective attempts at
inclusion of women in the formal and largely public process
would lead to any positive results as far as reclaiming their
rights are concerned. The exclusive operation of the law is in
the public domain, while the activities of women remain
confined to the private sphere. By leaving the private sphere
unregulated, the law perpetuates the invisibility of women
under the guide of apparent neutrality. 85 The inclination of
human rights and humanitarian law is towards criminalizing
acts occurring within the public sphere while mostly ignoring
the private. In most cases, the violence and discrimination
against women initiated during warfare continues well past the
formal conclusion of hostilities and are allowed to continue
unpunished. 87 This group believes that the problem is
magnified on account of the pervasive association of all things
private to be of lesser value than acts taking place in the public
sphere.
As discussed above, Resolution 2122 is ambiguous as to
what constitutes conflict and does not indicate whether
violence suffered by women in the private sphere, often beyond
182. See S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1; S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 112.
183. S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 1 ("The Security Council, ... 1. Recognizes
the need for consistent implementation of [Resolution 1325] in its own work
and intends to focus more attention on women's leadership and participation
in conflict resolution and peacebuilding,... ").
184. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Situating Women In Counterterrorism
Discourses: Undulating Masculinities And Luminal Femininities, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1085, 1086 (2013).
185. See Gardam, supra note 12, at 65.
186. This is evidenced, among other things, in the way torture has been
defined in the Convention against Torture. See Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
187. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 62 (1993).
188. Accord Aolain, supra note 184, at 1099-1100.
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official declaration of cessation of conflict, falls within its
ambit. It seems Resolution 2122 misses the mark when it
comes to bridging the public-private dichotomy as it is overtly
biased in favor of promoting women's roles in the public sphere.
A third approach, offered as a possible solution to this
dichotomy, in which some feminist commentators have
recognized the opportunities afforded by conflict to women.1
8 9
Violence has been found to "affect traditional, prewar gender
relations .... "190 It may be used to accelerate women's
empowerment as they take over traditionally male dominated
roles in the aftermath of armed conflict. 19' Conflict is believed
to provide "unique opportunities for women to undo highly
constrained social expectations and structures as a result of the
social flux that results from communal violence. Thus, inter
and intra-state violence creates a highly volatile terrain in
which great uncertainties, costs, and opportunities arise for
women, sometimes paradoxically in tandem. 92 The CEDAW
Committee in General Comment 30 has partially recognized
this possibility and exhorts states to exploit the strategic
advantages following the aftermath of conflict to adopt policies
and laws eliminating discrimination and fostering inclusion of
193women.
Resolution 2122, on the contrary, does not envisage women
in the role of perpetrator of violence or persons taking
advantage of violence. Rather, it focuses heavily on women's
roles as harbingers of peaceful transformation. It condemns
violence committed against/directly affecting civilians including
women but does not speak of women using the social flux
afforded by conflict to undo gender-hierarchies. It does
189. See generally Report on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding, supra
note 119 (detailing actions that should be taken for women to take advantage
of opportunities that arise as a result of conflict).
190. Tilman Brdick & Marc Vothknecht, Impact of Violent Conflicts on
Women's Economic Opportunities, in WOMEN AND WAR: POWER AND
PROTECTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 86 (Kathleen Kuehnast et al. eds.,
2011).
191. See generally Janna Thompson, Women and War, 14 WOMEN's STUD.
INT'L F. 63, 73 (1991) (explaining how women have been forced to take on new
roles and responsibilities because of armed conflict).
192. See generally Report on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding, supra
note 119 (detailing the specific measures that will be taken to help women
during and after a conflict).
193. Cf. Recommendation No. 30, supra note 24, at 8-10.
194. See S.C. Res. 2122, supra note [1], at 2. The Resolution expresses
concern at women's vulnerability during armed conflict and the threats and
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however state an "intention to include provisions to facilitate
women's full participation and protection in: election
preparation and political processes, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programs, security sector and
judicial reforms, and wider post-conflict reconstruction
processes. "1  What was crucial for Resolution 2122 to have
addressed is that gains made by women during conflict are lost
in the reconstruction phase. 96 Additionally, the lawlessness
created by conflict may be exploited by men to further
discrimination against women 97  and undo the good
contemplated in the provisions of Resolution 2122, none of
which currently appears to be taken into account.
VI. THE WAY FORWARD FOR FUTURE RESOLUTIONS
This section, in course of discussing possible models for
reformation in law and legal instruments, borrows heavily from
major feminist schools of thought and explores the
contributions of (a) cultural feminism; (b) liberal feminism; (c)
radical feminism; and (d) post-modern feminism to chart out
recommendations for reform. While all four schools, with their
sub-schools operating on different presumptions and advancing
diverse realities for women, the interplay between them cannot
be ignored and in discussing the two models of reformation of
existing law below, the influence and of all four schools, in
varying degrees, is irrefutable.
A. THE EQUALITY MODEL
While speaking of women's special needs, it has been said
that to redress harms is to improve protections for all citizens
or to ensure better enforcement of the already existing rules.
human rights violations against women during and after conflict. See id. It
also recognizes that women and girls who are vulnerable or disadvantaged
may be targeted and experience increased risk of violence. See idd. However,
Resolution 2122 does not acknowledge the possibility that women might be
perpetrators of violence during conflict. See id.
195. Id. at 4.
196. E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Rights
of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, Report of the expert of the
Secretary General, 88-89, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) (by Graca
Machel).
197. Gardam & Jarvis, supra note 10, at 11-18 (explaining how women's
experience of discrimination is intensified during armed conflict).
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This model asserts that the remedy may not necessarily lie in
re-examining the existing legal redress mechanism through
gender lenses as a gendered perspective towards humanitarian
and post-war reorganization efforts might promote further
isolation of women from mainstream power structures as
opposed to fostering inclusion. In fact, scholars such as
Professor Fineman have argued that "vulnerability" should be
reclaimed for its "potential in describing a universal, inevitable,
enduring aspect of the human condition that must be at the
heart of our concept of social and state responsibility," and
channelized to combat the vicious cycle in which women
inevitably get typecast as victims. 9 8 Once crisis and human
vulnerability is accepted as inevitable, lawmakers will be free
to tailor policies addressing structural inequalities and
discrimination faced by women.
This is also true with respect to a feminist approach to the
study of gender violence. Feminist theorists who have
contributed to the evolution of gender violence legislation have
focused on the heteronormative context in which violence
occurs. 99 The traditional focus on gendered notions of violence,
while crucial for the purpose of comprehending the cause of
marginalization of women, is dismissive of the exploitation or
violence men suffer from other men, as well as other categories
of violence emanating from this very hierarchical structure of.... 200
discrimination.
However, reforms based on the equality model have been
severely criticized as, "if it is accepted that women experience
warfare fundamentally differently from men, irrespective of
whether the latter are combatants or civilians, then laws that
198. See Fineman, supra note 11, at 8. International affairs scholar R.
Charli Carpenter has demonstrated how "gender ideologies generate and
project perceptions of vulnerability and innocence onto 'women-and-children'
while assuming that adult males and older boys are either combatants or
potential combatants." Barbara Sutton & Julie Novkov, Rethinking Security,
Confronting Inequality: An Introduction, in SECURITY DISARMED: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER, RACE, AND MILITARIZATION 16 (Barbara Sutton et
al. eds., 2008). This assumption results in humanitarian policies being
fashioned in a manner which ignores the needs of the male civilian population.
199. See generally Kristen Schilt & Laurel Westbrook, Doing Gender,
Doing Heteronormativity: "Gender Normals," Transgender People, and the
Social Maintenance of Heterosexuality, 23 GEN. & Soc'Y 440 (2009) (discussing
violence and heteronormativity).
200. Accord Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1995).
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take the experiences of men as the norm against which to
construct the rules are unjust."20 1 As Catharine Mackinnon
remarks, "man has become the measure of all things" and by
using men's experiences as a standard of equality, we
jeopardize recognizing women's experiences that do not
conform to notions of masculinity.0 2 By way of illustration,
while devising an appropriate mechanism for engendering
security, a starting point for men would be a presumption of
security offset by conflict. In contrast, the starting point for
women would be pre-existing insecurity magnified by conflict• • 203
conditions .
Thus, scholars like Professor Aolain advocate for reversing
the inquiry proposed by Professor Fineman. These scholars
propose contextualizing women's peculiar experiences as a
starting point upon which the experiences and vulnerabilities
generated by a particular crisis is then projected.2 °4 This
interplay of past inequalities and marginalization with present
harms and vulnerabilities engendered by the crisis will in their
opinion better address the compounding of vulnerability in
times of conflict.
Secondly, women, as a class that suffers, are not
homogenous and identifying a common thread of experiences
would prove difficult. The Durban Declaration and Program of
Action, which emerged from the 2001 UN World Conference
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and
Related Intolerance, commented upon the interplay of racism,
racial intolerance, and xenophobia on the discrimination
suffered by women. Obviously, the nature of this
201. Gardam, supra note 12, at 59.
202. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 34 (Harvard Univ. Press ed., 1987); see also CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 241-44 (Harvard
Univ. Press ed., 1989) ("The first task of a movement for social change is to
face one's situation and name it. The failure to face and criticize the reality of
women's condition, a failure of idealism and denial, is a failure of feminism in
its liberal forms. The failure to move beyond criticism, a failure of
determinism and radical paralysis, is a failure of feminism in its left
forms .... As sexual inequality is gendered as man and women, gender
inequality is sexualized as dominance and subordination .... The next step is
to recognize that male forms of power over women are affirmatively embodied
as individual rights in law.").
203. See ANNICK T.R. WIBBEN, FEMINIST SECURITY STUDIES: A NARRATIVE
APPROACH 10 (Routledge ed. 2011) (explaining the hopes of some feminists
that the 9/11 terrorist attacks might mobilize the women's rights movement).
204. See, e.g., Aolain, supra note 18, at 5-6.
205. World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
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discrimination varies greatly across geographic boundaries.
The CEDAW Committee, in General Recommendation 30,
documented the disproportionate impacts of conflict on rural
women compared to others.0 6 Thus, while the experiences of
women are certainly different from men,2 7 the effect of these
experiences also varies greatly across different cultures and
traditional roles women assume in their societies. In fact
recognizing that 'internationalization of responses' has led to
209foisting of global stereotypes on women, treaty monitoring
bodies are increasingly deferring to culturally relative
interpretations of the law, resulting in an obfuscation of the
existing masculinities which marginalize women on account of
their apparent gender-neutrality.2 10
A third criticism is levelled by feminists who oppose the
"silences in international law" and demand de-codification of
this silence by drawing attention to the dichotomies used to
structure international law. By operating through
private/public distinctions, the "symbolic system and culture" of
international law is permeated with gendered values, which
reinstate gender stereotypes and forfeit neutrality.2 1'
In its present form, the UNSC resolutions obviously do not
mirror the equality model. It appears that the equality model is
simply not feasible in conflict settings and certainly not
welcome in the context of thematic resolutions focused on
improving the lot of women ensnared in conflict and post-
conflict hiatuses. In fact, as discussed in the prior section,
Resolution 2122 should attempt to move further away from the
equality model in future and make accommodations for cultural
diversities which peculiarly affect women, recognize the
influence of the private sphere in determining women's
experiences, and recognize the asymmetry in the formalistic
notions of equality the genders are presumed to enjoy,
particularly in the conflict context.
Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, Durban, S. Afr., Aug. 31-Sept. 8, 2001,
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, 54(a), U.N. Doe.
A/CONF.189/12 (Jan. 1, 2002).
206. See Recommendation No. 30, supra note 24, 51.
207. See generally Copelon, supra note 86.
208. See id.; Center for Reproductive Rights, supra note77.
209. See Charlesworth, supra note 16, at 384.
210. Cf id. at 385-86.
211. See generally Beijing Platform, supra note 14.
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B. THE EQUAL YET DIFFERENT MODEL
A second approach, the mirror opposite of the equality
model, advocates for new, detailed laws designed to address
women's special needs. Articulation of this approach is not a
novel phenomenon. As far back as 1998, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, equipped with a
mandate covering situations of armed conflict, recommended
revising the Geneva Conventions applicable to international
armed conflict to "incorporate developing norms against women
during armed conflict."212  Feminist theorists have also
consistently identified existing laws as archaic, patriarchal,
and inadequate for protecting women against discrimination. 213
While theoretically accepting reforms are required which
re-contextualize gender, the proponents of this approach
diverge at the implementation level, with some advocating
formulation of new regulations while others ask for extensive,
purposive interpretations of existing law,21 4 which account for
gender specificity. 215 Disagreement also exists as to what form
the proposed reforms should take. For instance, in the debate
surrounding gendered revision of laws of war, one is confronted
with views ranging from appending an additional protocol
dealing with women, to adopting "soft" laws for the purpose of
'surfacing gender' within humanitarian law.21 The official
ICRC position maintains that the current laws of war already
protect women in armed conflict sufficiently and that the real
issue lies in poor enforcement.2 7 The second approach is
definitely meritorious, as long as the end result is not
formulation of standardized norms which ignore the non-
homogenous nature of women's experiences and leave us with a
218mere triumph of form over substance.
Resolution 2122, as is the case with other UNSC thematic
resolutions, leans towards this triumph of form in that it
recognizes the vulnerable position of women in society, making
212. Gardam & Jarvis, supra not 10, a.t 57i.
213. See, e.g., Rebecca Salonen, Current Issues in FMG Controversy: 3. The
Male Circumcision Debate, GODPARENTS NEWS, Aug. 2010, at 1, 1-2.
214. Cf U.N. ESCOR, supra note 5, 95.
215. See Helen Durham, Women, Armed Conflict and International Law,
84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 655, 657 (2002).
216. See Copelon, supra note 86.
217. See, e.g., Fran~oise Krill, The Protection of Women in International
Humanitarian Law, 249 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 337, 359 (1985).
218. See Chinkin, supra note 87, at 18.
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functional equality difficult to achieve. As Secretary General
Ban Ki Moon stated while opening the Resolution 2122 debate,
this idea revolves around the concept of gender equality and
human rights, while simultaneously recognizing the need to
have reforms specific the promotion of women's leadership and
recognizing their concerns. 219 The sentiment of member states
amply demonstrates this fact. For instance, the need to
criminalize all forms of sexual violence as 'sexual terrorism'
came up in course of the debate concerning the adoption of
Resolution 2122, as well as demands to end the labelling of the
killing of women and children as collateral damage.2 2 0 The
language of Resolution 2122 itself, though far more cautious,
certainly shows an inclination to favor a gendered re-
interpretation of the law favoring women.
Future resolutions adopted by the UNSC should strive to
formulate strategies that embody the "twin aims of challenging
the existing norms and devising a new agenda for theory."22'
These strategies must contest the silences in the law by
advocating for urgent reforms while simultaneously
reinterpreting the androcentric standards of existing
framework. It is crucial that the end result be a re-structuring
of international and national law-granting women greater
visibility.222 It will, as Elizabeth Gross puts it, "make clear how
dominance has been possible; and to make it no longer
viable. 223
219. See Statements by the Delegates, supra note 122, at 3.
220. Id. at 18-19, 21-22.
221. Margaret Thornton, Feminist Jurisprudence: Illusion or Reality?, 3
AuST'L J.L. & Soc'Y 5, 23 (1986).
222. See Arleen B. Dallery, The Politics of Writing (The) Body: Ecriture
Feminine, in GENDER/BODY/ KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF
BEING AND KNOWING 52, 59-65 (Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds.,
1989). French feminists have long undertaken the task of deconstructing
masculine themes appearing in law and have attempted to reinterpret the
"whole relationship between the subject and discourse, the subject and the
world, the subject and the cosmic, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic."
Luce Irigaray, FRENCH FEMINIST THOUGHT: A READER 119 (1987). In contrast,
although masculine social and linguistic structures have also concerned
Anglo-American feminists, they have generally not approached the issue by
developing a new model of discourse.
223. Elizabeth Gross, What is Feminist Theory?, in FEMINIST CHALLENGES:
SOCIAL & POLITICAL THEORY 197 (Carole Pateman & Elizabeth Gross eds.,
1989).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Skeptics might argue that in light of substantive
reproductive health provisions in other international human
rights and humanitarian law instruments, the mention of
access to reproductive health care services in Resolution 2122
is of no great import and fails to make novel inroads on the
path to full reproductive autonomy for women caught in
conflict and post-conflict situations. This Article argues that
this cynical position is not wholly true.
Considerable progress has been made regarding women
and armed coneict by bodies entrusted with protecting human
rights, particularly the UNSC. "Indeed, the process of
identifying women's particular experiences and demonstrating
the failure of the law to acknowledge them is more advanced in
this context than in organizations focusing solely on armed
con*ict."224 The Women and Peace and Security' Agenda of the
UNSC has become a fertile ground for "feminist curiosity" and
has assumed great importance amongst feminists as an
instrument for leveraging women's demands and needs. It has
generated unprecedented body of work on issues of women's
insecurity, the effect of such insecurity on the political order
vis-a-vis the insecurity of men, and women's oppression in the
politics of conflict and militarization. It has led to a tremendous
push for "transformative mainstreaming" as opposed to "just
add women and mix" approach to post conflict peacebuilding,225
which was typical of earlier UNSC resolutions.
With every resolution, the UNSC adds new items to the
agenda and strengthens deficiencies identified in past actions.
Only by critiquing shortcomings can we achieve a more gender
sensitive and inclusive need-based criteria in the future
resolutions. It is not enough to say that existing rules in other
instruments are adequate and that the energies of advocates,
academics, and lobbyists must focus solely on better
implementation. Society must act in unison to criticize and
protest a law, principle, or declaration that fails to give women
their due status at the time of its inception and prevent
formulation of rules that are essentially paternalistic and
define women's experiences from the perspective of men. One
224. Gardam & Charlesworth, supra note 99, at 150.
225. Anne Gallagher, Ending the Marginalization: Strategies for
Incorporating Women into the United Nations Human Rights System, 19 HUM.
RTS. Q. 283, 288 (1997).
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cannot expect a resolution aimed at increasing participation of
women to survive when it suffers from the same malady of
having been defined and conceptualized without reference to
women's perspectives.226 The temptation to give into token
responses or half-hearted solutions must be resisted and
demands be made for specific directives which adopt a firm
stand on reproductive health.2 27 Rather than hailing this
piecemeal declaration as a victory for reproductive rights,
activists should push for greater inclusion and specificity in the
next thematic resolution adopted by the UNSC, and ensuring
that the declaration is accompanied by training, monitoring,
and reporting requirements. This is a perfect time, therefore, to
finally break the silence.
226. Cf. Bartlett et al., supra note 35.
227. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 21, at 81.
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